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ABSTRACT: It can seem incoherent to fully characterize fundamentality in terms of 
grounding, given that the fundamental is precisely that which cannot be fully 
characterized independently. I argue that there is no such incoherence. 
 
 
Here I defend the coherence, though not the correctness, of fully 
characterizing metaphysical fundamentality in terms of grounding. 
According to some, there is an important metaphysical relation of 
grounding. This relation is intimately connected to metaphysical 
explanation, and we express it by saying that x holds “in virtue of” y. 
Grounding theorists disagree about whether or not the concept of 
grounding is semantically basic and about whether or not the relation of 
grounding is metaphysically fundamental.1 
Grounding theorists have often attempted to use grounding to 
characterize many other metaphysically important properties and 
relations, such as the property of being metaphysically fundamental. The 
grounding theorist might suggest, for example, that for something to be 
metaphysically fundamental is for it not to be grounded, or perhaps for it 
to be a constituent of a fact that is not grounded. Many other 
characterizations in a similar spirit are possible.2 
Others, however, would resist any attempt to characterize 
fundamentality in terms of grounding on the basis of: 
 
The simple argument: 
 
(1) The fundamental cannot be fully characterized independently. 
 
(C) Therefore, the fundamental cannot be fully characterized in 
terms of grounding.3 
 
                                                 
1 I believe that the spirit of what I will say below applies equally to the view that there is a 
grounding operator rather than a grounding relation (Fine (2012)). Influential discussions of 
grounding include Fine (2001), Schaffer (2009), and Rosen (2010). For an example of a state-of-
the-art theory of grounding, see Schaffer (2016).  
2 Schaffer (2009) appears to give something like the first suggestion. Rosen (2010, p. 112) offers a 
more developed version of the second suggestion. 
3 Wilson (2014, p. 560) endorses this argument: “The suggestion … is that the posit of Grounding 
is needed metaphysically to characterize the fundamental as the un-Grounded…. The suggestion 
can be resisted, however …. The fundamental should not be metaphysically characterized … in 
any other terms. The fundamental is, well, fundamental.” She repeats the argument in her (2016a, 
pp. 192-3).  
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The rationale for premise (1) is straightforward: a fundamental entity is 
precisely one which cannot be fully characterized in terms of other entities. 
(I use the term “entity” as a maximally broad sortal, covering objects, 
properties, relations, events, states of affairs, facts, etc.) A fortiori, then, the 
fundamental cannot be characterized in terms of grounding. 
Here I show that this simple argument, while perhaps sound, does 
not undermine the attempt to fully characterize fundamentality in terms 
of grounding. Nor do variants of the simple argument fare any better. To 
think otherwise is to elide the distinction between a property and its 
bearer.4  
 
 
1. Rebutting the simple argument and its variants 
 
Consider a red apple. Obviously we must distinguish between the property 
of redness and the apple: the former is a property, and the latter is 
something that instantiates that property. Equally obviously, the 
properties of the bearer need not be properties of the property, and vice-
versa: the apple is red, but the property of redness is not itself red; the 
property of redness is a color property, but the apple is not a color 
property. 
Keeping these obvious remarks in mind, let us grant premise (1): 
whatever is fundamental cannot be fully characterized independently. Let 
us therefore grant the conclusion as well: the fundamental cannot be fully 
characterized in terms of grounding. The crucial point is that premise (1) 
says only that fundamental entities cannot be fully characterized 
independently, and likewise the conclusion says only that fundamental 
entities cannot be fully characterized in terms of grounding. Premise (1) 
does not say that the property of fundamentality cannot be fully characterized 
independently, nor does the conclusion say that the property of 
fundamentality cannot be fully characterized in terms of grounding.  
Suppose then that there is some entity, a quark perhaps, that is 
fundamental. The quark cannot be fully characterized independently; it 
follows that the quark cannot be fully characterized in terms of grounding. 
But it does not follow that the property of fundamentality itself cannot be fully 
characterized in terms of other entities. It is perfectly consistent for the 
grounding theorist to say, for example, that for something to be 
fundamental is for it not to be grounded. She will then say that the quark is 
not grounded in anything, while also saying that the quark’s being 
                                                 
4 Roughly the objection that I will offer has been given before in very compressed form – see 
Cameron (2016, p. 389, fn. 7) and Raven (2016, pp. 14-15). The objection also appears in an earlier 
version of Berker (forthcoming), though I am told that it will be cut from the published version. 
Here I will develop the objection much more fully than it has been developed before, rebut a recent 
attempt to repair the simple argument (Wilson (2016b)), and suggest that further repairs should 
not be attempted. 
 I thank an anonymous referee for his/her thoughtful assistance in situating this paper 
relative to these other works. 
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fundamental is grounded in something – in particular, that it is grounded 
in the quark’s not being grounded in anything.5 
At least, it is perfectly consistent for the grounding theorist to say 
this unless the property of fundamentality is itself fundamental. For if the 
property of fundamentality is itself fundamental, then, by premise (1), it 
cannot be fully characterized independently. A fortiori, it cannot be fully 
characterized in terms of grounding. But there is nothing forcing the 
grounding theorist to concede that the property of being fundamental is 
itself fundamental. After all, it is perfectly common for a property not to 
instantiate itself – the property of being red is not itself red. The grounding 
theorist is committed to saying that, likewise, the property of being 
fundamental is not itself fundamental. 
Indeed, this commitment is independently plausible, for the 
rationale for premise (1) already seems to suggest a full characterization of 
fundamentality. According to that rationale, a fundamental entity is 
precisely one which cannot be fully characterized in terms of other entities. 
This seems not only to tell us something about entities that are 
fundamental; it seems also to tell us what it is for an entity to be 
fundamental – at least to a first approximation. (We can see the grounding 
theorist as attempting to make this first approximation exact.) And if we 
have here, or somewhere nearby, a full characterization of the property of 
being fundamental in terms of other entities, then – given that a 
fundamental entity is one which cannot be fully characterized in terms of 
other entities – it follows that the property of being fundamental is not 
itself fundamental. 
 Notice that the following argument is no better: 
 
The revised argument: 
 
(1*) All that is fundamental, taken together, cannot be fully 
characterized independently. 
 
(C*) Therefore, all that is fundamental, taken together, cannot be 
fully characterized in terms of grounding. 
 
In replacing (1) with (1*), we allow that a particular fundamental entity 
might be fully characterized in terms of one or more distinct fundamental 
entities. Think of the way that metaphysical possibility can be fully 
characterized in terms of metaphysical necessity and vice-versa. (1*) would 
allow us to treat both metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity 
as fundamental if we so desired, while (1) would force us into a seemingly 
arbitrary choice of treating at most one of these as fundamental.6,7 
                                                 
5 Many would claim that only facts, and thus not objects like quarks, stand in grounding relations. 
My argument can easily be reframed to accommodate this claim. 
6 I thank Selim Berker for drawing my attention to this example in a related context. 
7 I interpret Wilson (2016b, pp. 5-6) as endorsing the revised argument. She states, “If anything is 
appropriately seen as not determined by other facts or goings-on at a world, it is, I claim, the overall 
extension of what is fundamental” (final emphasis mine, all other emphases hers). Wilson explicitly 
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The revised argument, like its predecessor, may be sound. But to 
think that (C*) tells against characterizing fundamentality in terms of 
grounding is to commit the same error as before – the error of eliding the 
distinction between the property of fundamentality and its bearers. For 
consider all of the entities that are fundamental. Perhaps these will include 
certain particles, fields, natural and metaphysical laws, and so forth. (1*) 
entails that these particles, fields, laws, etc. cannot together be fully 
characterized independently, and (C*) entails that these particles, fields, 
laws, etc. cannot together be fully characterized in terms of grounding. As 
long as grounding is not itself a fundamental entity – and it is not clear 
that the grounding theorist must grant this claim, but let us do so anyway 
– then (C*) does follow from (1*). But (1*) is perfectly compatible with 
there being a full independent characterization of those particles, fields, laws, 
etc. all being fundamental, and (C*) is perfectly compatible with giving that 
full independent characterization in terms of grounding. 
By now it should be obvious that no variant of the simple argument 
will succeed. Perhaps that which is fundamental cannot be fully 
characterized independently, or perhaps there is some other true premise 
in this neighborhood. Even so, it is perfectly coherent, whether or not it is 
correct, for the grounding theorist to offer a full characterization of 
fundamentality itself. 
 
 
2. A way forward? 
 
Still, it is also perfectly coherent to accept fundamentality primitivism, 
the view that there is no independent full characterization of 
fundamentality. While the fundamentality primitivist should not pursue 
further revisions of the simple argument, I will suggest a more promising 
idea for the fundamentality primitivist to explore.8 
The characterizations of fundamentality considered in this paper 
involve commitment to a pair of claims – a weaker conditional claim and a 
stronger explanatory claim – each of which connects fundamentality to 
grounding. Just to take an example: 
 
 
 
                                                 
frames this as a response to Berker and Raven (see fn. 4), but as far as I can see the only change in 
her argument is to appeal to the overall extension of what is fundamental – to all fundamental 
entities, taken together – where the original argument appeals to particular fundamental entities. 
This interpretation is further supported by her clarification that she wishes to allow “that 
fundamental goings-on themselves may ‘hold in virtue of something’ – e.g., may metaphysically 
depend on each other” (2016b, p. 5, her emphasis). 
8 In addition to Wilson, possible fundamentality primitivists include Fine (2001) and Barnes 
(2012). I make these attributions tentatively because Fine and Barnes openly suggest that the 
concept of fundamentality is semantically basic, but it is unclear whether they mean also to suggest 
that fundamentality itself is metaphysically fundamental. 
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Simple conditional claim: For any entity x, if x is fundamental, 
then x is ungrounded. 
 
Simple explanatory claim: For any entity x, if x is fundamental, 
then (x is ungrounded and x’s being ungrounded fully explains x’s 
being fundamental). 
 
In offering variants of the simple argument, the fundamentality primitivist 
was primarily (and unsuccessfully) targeting the weaker conditional claim; 
the stronger explanatory claim would just have been collateral damage. 
The revised argument, for example, was driven by the concern that 
metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity might both be 
fundamental even while each is grounded in the other, a concern which 
primarily targets the simple conditional claim. 
But I encourage the fundamentality primitivist to abandon not just 
the simple argument and its variants, but the entire strategy of targeting 
such conditional claims. The problem is that the grounding theorist can 
readily modify the conditional claim (as well as the explanatory claim) as 
necessary. In this case, the grounding theorist might concede that a 
fundamental entity need not be ungrounded; a fundamental entity need 
only be an element of some minimal group of entities that are identical to 
or ground everything else. To be precise: 
 
Revised conditional claim: If entity x1 is fundamental, then x1 is 
a member of some group x1 … xn such that (every entity is either 
grounded in or identical to entities x1 … xn, and there are no 
entities y1 … ym such that (m < n, and every entity is either 
grounded in or identical to y1 … ym)). 
 
The revised conditional claim allows that metaphysical possibility and 
metaphysical necessity might each be fundamental despite grounding one 
another. For there might be one such minimal group that includes 
metaphysical possibility and whose elements together ground 
metaphysical necessity; but there might also be another such minimal 
group that includes metaphysical necessity and whose elements together 
ground metaphysical possibility. 
This is not the end of the story, of course; to mention just one 
complication, the revised conditional claim will not adequately treat 
worlds in which there are infinitely many fundamental entities. But my 
point is more general: the grounding theorist has access to very rich formal 
resources in her attempt to construct a suitable conditional claim relating 
fundamentality to grounding. The fundamentality primitivist is welcome 
to try to rule out every conditional claim of this type, but this strategy does 
not seem especially promising. 
For this reason I encourage the fundamentality primitivist to accept 
that there might well be some suitable conditional claim relating 
fundamentality to grounding. I encourage her to argue instead that the 
matching explanatory claim is false: to argue that it is fundamentality that 
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explains grounding, and not the other way around. In other words, the 
fundamentality primitivist might understand her claim that 
fundamentality cannot be fully characterized independently as the claim 
that fundamentality cannot be fully explained independently. 
Regardless of whether the fundamentality primitivist heeds my 
suggestion, however, her view gains no support from the mere observation 
that the fundamental cannot be characterized independently. That has 
been the central moral of this paper. 
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